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Abstract
We characterize optimal selling protocols/equilibria of a game in which an Agent ﬁrst
puts hidden eﬀort to acquire information and then transacts with a Firm that uses this
information to take a decision. We determine the equilibrium payoﬀs that maximize incen-
tives to acquire information. Our analysis is similar to ﬁnding ex ante optimal self-enforcing
contracts since information sharing, outcomes and transfers cannot be contracted upon. We
show when and how selling and transmitting information gradually helps. We also show
how mixing/side bets increases the Agent’s incentives.
Keywords: value of information, dynamic game.
JEL codes: C72, D82, D83
∗We thank Daron Acemoglu, Robert Aumann, Hector Chade, Alex Frankel, Drew Fudenberg, David Kreps,
Max Kwiek, R.Vijay Krishna, Soﬁa Moroni, Romans Pancs, Arthur Robson, Rann Smorodinsky and seminar
participants at the Barcelona JOCS, the Collegio Carlo Alberto, Turin, Essex University, the European University
Institute, Harvard-MIT, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Northwestern University, Oxford University,
Simon Fraser University, Stanford University, University of British Columbia, University of Western Ontario, UC
San Diego, Yale, X-HEC Paris, Paris Sciences Economiques, Toulouse School of Economics, the SED 2009 meeting,
the Stony Brook 2010 game theory conference, and the 2011 Asian meeting of the Econometric Society for useful
comments and suggestions.
†Yale University, 30 Hillhouse Ave., New Haven, CT 06520, USA. johannes.horner@yale.edu.
‡Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, 518 Memorial Way, Stanford, CA 94305, USA.
andy@gsb.stanford.edu.
11 Introduction
In this paper, we study a dynamic game of selling information in which players cannot use
external enforcement of contracts. Motivated by a moral hazard problem of acquiring informa-
tion, we describe equilibria that maximize ex ante eﬃciency of a decision problem in which an
Agent needs to acquire information that a Firm can later use to make a decision.
The selling information game is divided into rounds of communication. Within a round, the
players ﬁrst can transfer payments and then the Agent can send some information to the Firm.
We assume that information is veriﬁable and divisible. In particular, in our model the Agent has
one of two types (i.e. she has a binary information about the optimal Firm decision) and the
information transmission is modeled as tests to verify the Agent’s information. Veriﬁability of
information means that each test has a known diﬃculty so that the type-1 Agent can always pass
it but the type-0 Agent can pass it only with some known probability (so it is not a cheap talk).
Easy tests have a high probability of being passed by the type-0. Divisibility of information
means that there is a rich set of tests with varying diﬃculties.
In this game we construct tight bounds on the limits of the diﬀerence between type-1 and
type-0 Agent payoﬀs as the number of possible communication rounds grows to inﬁnity (we
show an example where maximizing this diﬀerence is necessary for optimal incentive provision to
acquire information). We characterize three such bounds: when we consider only pure-strategy
equilibria (in which type-1 always passes the test), when we allow for mixed-strategy equilibria
(when type-1 may be mixing between passing and failing a test) and ﬁnally if we allow for noisy
tests that even the type-1 may not be able to pass (in the absence of noisy tests, the same
outcome can be achieved with the help of a trusted intermediary, for instance).
Since we assume that the agents cannot commit to payments or information disclosure, our
equilibria can be viewed as the best self-enforcing contracts that the players would like to co-
ordinate on ex ante. Alternatively, these equilibria describe the maximum payoﬀs achievable
in any equilibrium without external enforcement (as a function of the communication protocol)
and hence allow us to divide the value of explicit contracts into the coordination part and the
enforcement part.
Lack of commitment creates a hold-up problem: since the Agent is selling information, once
2the Firm learns it, it has no reason to pay for it (see Arrow, 1959). Therefore, it seems at ﬁrst
diﬃcult to make the Firm pay diﬀerent amounts to diﬀerent types, since such screening would
inform the Firm about the Agent’s type and lead it to renege on payments. Although we can
make the Firm pay for a piece of information, it is necessary that it pays before it learns it.
That leads to our ﬁrst main result that “splitting information” generally increases the dif-
ference in payoﬀs. That is, it is usually better for incentives if the Agent takes two tests in a
sequence (and is paid for each separately) than if she takes both of them at once (which is equiv-
alent to taking one harder test). That intuition underlies the structure of the best equilibrium in
pure strategies in our leading example: ﬁrst, an initial chunk of information is given away for free
that leads the Firm to be indiﬀerent between both decisions. Then the Agent sells information
in dribs and drabs and gets paid a little for each bit. Although the expression for the limit payoﬀ
depends on the assumption that there is a very rich set of tests and arbitrarily many rounds of
communication, the beneﬁt of splitting does not depend on either assumption.
Second, we show how mixed strategies can help improve performance of the contract. In the
best pure-strategy equilibrium the type-0 Agent collects (in expectation) a non-trivial amount of
payments, which leaves room for improvement. We ﬁrst show that using (non-observable) mixed
strategies can help by taking advantage of the fact that type-1 Agent and the Firm may have
diﬀerent (endogenous) risk attitudes (more precisely, if the sum of their continuation payoﬀs is
not concave).
Mixed strategies can be further improved upon if the players have access to tests that both
types can fail with positive probability, or alternatively, by assuming that players have access
to a trusted intermediary that can “noise up” the tests (i.e., the intermediator’s role is to allow
the Agent to commit to a mixed strategy). Such tests allow us to exploit also the diﬀerence in
beliefs between the Firm and the two types of the Agent, regarding the very own evolution of the
Firm’s belief about the Agent’s type. This form of communication makes it possible for type-1
of the Agent to use side-bets (in which the Agent pays the Firm upon a failure of the test) to
extract the entire expected surplus of the information.
Our ﬁnding that selling information gradually is beneﬁcial to the seller should (in terms of
providing the highest incentives to acquire information) come as no surprise to anyone who was
3ever involved in consulting. The free ﬁrst consultation is also reminiscent of standard business
practice. The further beneﬁts of intermediation might be more surprising. Yet it is indeed
common practice to hire third party to evaluate the value of information. This third party
structure is used as a “buﬀer” to ensure that the buyer does not have access to any unnecessary
conﬁdential information about the seller at any point during the sales process.1
Most of the paper (Sections 2 and 3) analyzes the information sales problem for the speciﬁc
payoﬀ structure that is inherited from the motivating game of information acquisition. However,
there is nothing particular about this motivating example. In Section 4, we generalize our results
to arbitrary speciﬁcations of how the Firm’s payoﬀ varies with its belief about the Agent’s
information. This speciﬁcation could arise from decision problems that are more complicated
than the binary one considered in the example. We prove that selling information in small bits is
proﬁtable as long as this payoﬀ function is star-shaped, that is, as long as its average is increasing
in the belief. Moreover, we show that, with rich enough tests, the type-1 Agent can extract the
entire expected value quite generally.
The paper is related to the literature on hold-up, for example Gul (2001) and Che and
S´ akovics (2004). One diﬀerence is that in our game what is being sold is information and hence
the value of past pieces sold depends on the realization of value of additional pieces. Moreover,
we assume that there is no physical cost of selling a piece of information and hence the Agent
does not care per se about how much information the Firm gets or what action it takes. In
contrast, in Che and S´ akovics (2004) each piece of the project is costly to the Agent and the
problem is how to provide incentives for this observable eﬀort rather than unobservable eﬀort in
our model. Finally, our focus is on the diﬀerent ways of information transmission, which is not
present in any of these papers.
The formal maximization problem, and in particular the structural constraints on information
revelation, are reminiscent of the literature on long cheap talk. See, in particular, Forges (1990)
and Aumann and Hart (2003), and, more generally, Aumann and Maschler (1995). As is the case
here, the problem is how to “split” a martingale optimally over time. That is, the Firm’s belief is
1We thank Rann Smorodinsky for sharing his experience in this respect. As a seller of software, the sale
involved no less than three third parties specialized in this kind of intermediation –Johnson-Laird, Inc., Construx
Software and NextGeneration Software Ltd.
4a martingale, and the optimal strategy speciﬁes its distribution over time. There are important
diﬀerences between our paper and the motivation of these papers, however. In particular, unlike
in that literature, payoﬀ-relevant actions are taken before information disclosure is over, since the
Firm pays the Agent as information gets revealed over time. In fact, with a mediator, the Agent
also makes payments to the Firm during the communication phase. As in Forges and Koessler
(2008), messages are type-dependent, as the Agent is constrained in the messages she can send
by the information she actually owns. Cheap-talk (i.e. the possibility to send messages from
sets that are type-independent) is of no help in our model. Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille (2009)
consider the problem of information exchange between two informed parties in a repeated game
without transfers, and establish a folk theorem. In all these papers, the focus is on identifying
the best equilibrium from the Agent’s perspective in the ex ante sense, i.e. before her type is
known. In our case, this is trivial and does not deliver diﬀerential payoﬀs to the Agent’s types.
Therefore, such an equilibrium does not provide the Agent with incentives to engage in inventive
activities in the ﬁrst place (which determine the probability with which an Agent is informed).
To do so requires identifying the best equilibrium from the point of view of a particular type of
the Agent.
The martingale property is distinctive of information, and this is a key diﬀerence between our
set-up and other models in which gradualism appears. In particular, the beneﬁts of gradualism
are well-known in games of public goods provision (see Admati and Perry, 1991, Compte and
Jehiel, 2004 and Marx and Matthews, 2000). Contributions are costly in these games, whereas
information disclosure is not costly per se. In fact, costlessness is a second hallmark of information
disclosure that plays an important role in the analysis. (On the other hand, the speciﬁc order of
moves is irrelevant for the results, unlike in contribution games.) The opportunity cost of giving
information away is a function of the equilibrium to be played. So, unlike in public goods game,
the marginal (opportunity) cost of information is endogenous. Relative to sales of private goods,
the marginal value of information cannot be ascertained without considering the information as
a whole, very much as for public goods.
But it is important to stress that by information, we mean here information that is relevant
for commonly known choice, such as an investment opportunity. The object of this information
5is not unknown per se.
Our focus (proving one owns information) and instrument (tests that imperfectly discriminate
between an Agent that holds information or not) are reminiscent of the literature on zero-
knowledge proofs, which also stresses the beneﬁts of repeating such tests. This literature that
starts with the paper of Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoﬀ (1985) is too large to survey here.
A key diﬀerence is that, in that literature, passing a test conveys information about the type
without revealing anything valuable (factoring large numbers into primes does not help the tester
factoring numbers himself). In many economic applications, however, it is hard to convince the
buyer that the seller has information without giving away some of it, which is costly –as it is in
our model.
Indeed, unlike in public goods games, or zero-knowledge proofs, splitting information is not
always optimal. As mentioned, this hinges on a (commonly satisﬁed) property of the Firm’s
payoﬀ, as a function of its belief about the Agent’s type.
Less related are some papers in industrial organization. Our paper is complementary to Anton
and Yao (1994 and 2002) in which an inventor tries to obtain a return to his information in the
absence of property rights. In Anton and Yao (1994) the inventor has the threat of revealing
information to competitors of the Firm and it allows him to receive payments even after she
gives the Firm all information. In Anton and Yao (2002) some contingent payments are allowed
and the inventor can use them together with competition among ﬁrms to obtain positive return
to her information. In contrast, in our model, there are no contingent payments and we assume
that only one Firm can use the information.
Finally, there is a vast literature directly related to the value of information. See, among
others, Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988 and 1990). Es˝ o and Szentes (2007) take a mechanism design
approach to this problem, while Gentzkow and Kamenica (2009) apply ideas similar to Aumann
and Maschler (1995) to study optimal information disclosure policy when the Agent does not
have private information about the state of the world, but cares about the Firm’s action.
62 The Main Example
We shall motivate this example by considering the following decision problem.
2.1 The Decision Problem
Consider the problem of an Agent who must decide whether to acquire information or not.
This information will then be sold to a Firm in a second stage. This second stage is the ultimate
focus of our analysis. Here we describe this ﬁrst stage in which information is acquired.
There are two states of Nature, sN ∈ {L,H}, with prior P[sN = H] = ρ ∈ (0,1). The Agent
privately chooses an eﬀort level e ∈ [0, ¯ e] at cost c(e). The diﬀerentiable function c is strictly
increasing and convex, with c(0) = c′(0) = 0, and c′(¯ e) > ρ.
Given e, the Agent privately observes a signal, the private state ω ∈ Ω := {0,1}, with
P[ω = 0|sN = L] = 1,P[ω = 1|sN = H] = e.
Hence, conditional on private state 1, the probability of sN = H is 1, while




Given eﬀort e, the unconditional probability of the Agent being in the private state 1 is p0 := ρ·e.
Information is useful because an investment decision must be taken, whose return depends
on the state of nature. Not investing yields a safe (i.e., state-independent) payoﬀ normalized to
0. Investing yields a payoﬀ 1 when sN = H and −ˆ γ < 0 when sN = L. Hence, conditional on











if ω = 0, and 1 if ω = 1. We assume that γ > 0 (for all feasible e), i.e., investing is optimal if
and only if the private state is ω = 1. Hence, the expected surplus is ρ · e − c(e), so that the
7ﬁrst-best eﬀort solves
c
′ (eFB) = ρ.
However, it is not the Agent, but the Firm who takes the investment decision and reaps its
beneﬁts. The Firm observes neither the exerted eﬀort level nor the resulting private state.
Based on its expectation e∗ about the Agent’s eﬀort level, the Firm forms a posterior belief p0
that ω = 1. This belief aﬀects how the surplus will be split in the second stage. Anticipating
revenues V1 (p0) and V0 (p0) from the second stage, if the private state is ω = 1 or 0, respectively,
the Agent’s eﬀort e∗ must maximize
ρeV1 (p0) + (1 − ρe)V0(p0) − c(e),
and so, assuming that V1 (p0) > V0 (p0), e∗ solves
c
′ (e
∗) = ρ(V1 (p0) − V0 (p0)). (1)
Unless V1(p0) = 1 and V0(p0) = 0, equilibrium eﬀort is below ﬁrst-best.2 This is a standard
hold-up problem, although investment is unobservable here. Because c is convex, social welfare
is then maximized when the diﬀerence V1 (p0) − V0 (p0) is highest.
This gives us the motivation and the objective function for the game played in the second
stage that determines the split of the surplus, to which we now turn.3
2.2 The Game of “Selling Information”
Some basic ingredients of this game are inherited from the decision problem. As this game
can be understood independently from the decision problem, we repeat them here, so that the
exposition be self-contained.
There are two risk-neutral players: an Agent (she) and a Firm (it). There are two states of
the world, ω ∈ Ω := {0,1}. The Agent is privately informed of the state of the world at the
2Shares of surplus V0,V1 will always be in [0,1].
3It is straightforward to extend this decision problem to the case of more general outside options, as described
in Section 4.
8beginning of the game, but the Firm is not. The Firm’s prior belief that the state is 1 is p0,
which is common knowledge. The fact that the Agent is perfectly informed is a normalization.4
The game lasts K rounds, but our focus will be on what happens as K grows arbitrarily large.
After the K rounds have elapsed, the Firm must take a binary action a ∈ {I,N}. Either the Firm
chooses to “Invest” (I) or to “Not Invest” (N). Not investing yields a safe payoﬀ normalized to
0. Investing yields a payoﬀ 1 if ω = 1 and −γ < 0 if ω = 0. That is, the “Investing” action is
risky: it can pay more than the safe action, but only in one state. The parameter γ measures
the cost of taking this action, if it is inappropriate.
Because the Agent knows the state, call her the type-1 Agent if ω = 1, and the type-0 Agent
otherwise.
Note that, absent any information revelation, the Firm’s optimal action is to invest if and






and obtain thereby a payoﬀ of
w(p) := (p − (1 − p)γ)
+,
where x+ := max{0,x}. While our analysis will cover both the case in which the prior belief p0
is below or above p∗, we shall often focus on the more interesting case in which p0 is smaller than
p∗, unless stated otherwise. The payoﬀ w(p) is the Firm’s outside option, and we shall generalize
the analysis to outside options with rather arbitrary speciﬁcations in Section 4.
In each of the K rounds before the action is taken, the Firm and Agent can make a monetary
transfer, and the Agent can reveal some information if she wishes to. More precisely, the strategy
has two parts. In rounds k = 1,...,K, as a function of the history of transfers and information
disclosures up to that point, the Agent and the Firm can simultaneously make a non-negative
transfer tA
k and tF
k , respectively, to the other party.5 Second, once these transfers are made and
4Here, a state of the world is what we called a private state in the decision problem. With that interpretation
of the information that is available to the Agent, the fact that she is perfectly informed is somewhat tautological.
5The Reader might wonder why we allow the Agent to pay the Firm. After all, it is the Agent who owns
the unique valuable good, information. Indeed, as we shall see, such payments are irrelevant when only pure
strategies are considered. But they play a critical role once more general strategies are considered.
9observed, the Agent may disclose some veriﬁable information.6
Information disclosure/gradual persuasion is modeled as follows. The Agent chooses a number
m ∈ [0,1]. This choice is observed by the Firm. Number 1 − m represents the diﬃculty of the
test that the Agent picks: The type-1 Agent can always pass the test (though she can choose to
fail it), while the type-0 Agent can only pass it with probability m. The realizations of tests are
independent across periods (and values of m), conditional on the state.
Note that the Agent can always choose an uninformative test if she wishes to, by picking
m = 1. This is interpreted as not revealing any information. If m < 1 and the Agent passes the
test, we say that information gets disclosed.
Note that, given any belief p ∈ (0,1) that the Firm might assign to state 1 and for any p′ ≥ p,
there exists a test that leads the Firm to update its belief to p′, if the Agent passes it. Indeed,







independently of her type, and does not ﬂunk it on purpose, it follows from Bayes’ rule that the
posterior belief assigned to ω = 1 is equal to
p
p + (1 − p)m
= p
′.7
If the Agent fails the test, then the Firm correctly updates its belief to zero.8
The set of possible tests that we assume is rich, and implies that information is perfectly
divisible.9 This allows us to conduct the analysis entirely in terms of beliefs, and to make
abstraction from issues relative to the type of information that is being disclosed, leaving open
some fascinating questions (for instance, in which order should information be released?). Tests
6It is easy to see that nothing hinges on this timing. Payments could be made sequentially rather than
simultaneously, and could occur after rather than before information disclosure.
7A modeling issue arises for p = 0. What if the Firm, after some history of transfers and disclosures, assigns
probability 0 to ω = 1, but the Agent then passes a test with m = 0? But our purpose is to identify the best
equilibrium, not to characterize the set of all equilibria, and so this issue is irrelevant: the equilibria we shall
describe remain equilibria if it is required that players cannot switch away from probability 1 beliefs, and remain
the best equilibria if this requirement (not imposed by perfect Bayesian equilibrium) is dropped.
8That is, unless the type-1 Agent is expected to ﬂunk it on purpose with positive probability.
9Yet our result that it is better to “split information” by using two easier tests instead of a diﬃcult one also
holds when the set of tests is coarse.
10only serve the purpose of modeling how beliefs can evolve gradually, and could be replaced with
any other formalism achieving the same end. But richer sets of tests could be conceived of and
will be considered in the analysis: for instance, we might wish to consider tests that even the
type-1 Agent could fail with some positive probability, so that the Firm’s belief that the Agent
is of type 1 can go down just as gradually as it can go up.
The Agent does not care about the Firm’s decision per se. All she seeks to do is to maximize
the sum of the net transfers she receives during the K rounds. The Firm seeks to maximize
the payoﬀ from its decision after the K rounds, net of the payments that it has made. There is
neither discounting, nor any other type of frictions during the K rounds. In particular, there is
no cost to disclosing information.
2.2.1 Histories and Payoﬀs











+ × [0,1] × {0,1}. Here, mk is the diﬃculty of the test chosen by the
Agent in stage k and rk is the result of that test (which is either positive, 1, or negative, 0). The
set of all such histories is denoted Hk (set H0 := ∅). Given some ﬁnal history hK (this does not
include the Firm’s ﬁnal action to invest or not), the Agent’s realized payoﬀ is simply the sum of









Given state ω, the Firm’s overall payoﬀ results from its action, as well as from the sum of net

















k ) + 1 · 1ω=1 − γ · 1ω=0,
where 1A denotes the indicator function of the event A.
2.2.2 Strategies and Equilibrium
A (behavior) strategy σF for the Firm is a collection ({τF
k }
K−1
k=0 ,αF), where (i) τF
k is a proba-
bility transition τF
k := Hk → R+, specifying a transfer tF
k := τF(hk) as a function of the (public)
history so far, as well as (ii) an action (a probability transition as well), αF : HK → {I,N} after
the K-th round.





k=0 , where (i) τA
k : Ω×Hk →
R+ is a probability transition specifying the transfer tA
k := τA(hk) in round k given the history
so far and given the information she has, (ii) µA
k : Ω×Hk×R2
+ → [0,1] is a probability transition
specifying the information that is released in round k (i.e., the value of m), as a function of the
state, the history up to the current round, and the transfers that were made in the round, and
(iii) ρA
k : Ω×Hk×R2
+ → {0,1} is the decision to ﬂunk the test on purpose, given the outstanding
test.10
A prior belief p0 and a strategy proﬁle σ := (σF,σA) deﬁne a distribution over Ω×HK×{I,N},
and we let V (σ),W(σ), or simply V,W, denote the expected payoﬀs of the Agent and the Firm,
respectively, with respect to this distribution. When the strategy proﬁle is understood, we also
write V (hk),W(hk) for the players’ continuation payoﬀs, given history hk. We further write
V0,V1, for the payoﬀ to the Agent, when we condition on the state ω = 0,1.
The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium, as deﬁned in Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991, Deﬁnition 8.2).11
10Note that, for notational simplicity, we assume that the Agent’s private strategy does not depend on her past
private information –whether she has ﬂunked the test on purpose in the past– aside from the state of the world.
Nothing can be gained by considering such strategies. Further, this allows us to view this game as a multistage
game, and so to apply Fudenberg and Tirole’s deﬁnition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
11Fudenberg and Tirole deﬁne perfect Bayesian equilibria for ﬁnite multistage games with observed actions only.
Here instead, both the type space and the action sets are inﬁnite. The natural generalization of their deﬁnition
12This game admits a plethora of equilibria. Our focus is to identify the equilibrium that
maximizes the spread V1−V0. Given the decision problem of Subsection 2.1, the motivation is two-
fold. First, if the Firm and the Agent could coordinate ex ante (i.e. before the decision problem)
and make side-payments, then clearly it would be in their interest to choose an equilibrium
that maximizes the ex ante payoﬀs, as a form of a self-enforcing contract (or relational contract).
Second, we are interested in the upper bound on eﬃciency that can be achieved without property
rights, through such self-enforcing contracts, to better understand the agency costs, and how they
depend on the coordination failures vs. on the constraints from the way information is sold and
acquired (that is, in the spirit of mechanism design, we separate the question of what is the most
any equilibrium can achieve from the question of how to coordinate on that equilibrium).
To recap, we are interested in the limit of the diﬀerence in the Agents’ payoﬀs as the number
of rounds becomes arbitrarily large.12 To do so, we shall relax the problem by assuming that
players have access to a public randomization device at the beginning of every round (a draw
from a uniform distribution), as this will facilitate one argument. The resulting equilibria that
we consider (whether we consider pure or mixed strategies, or allow a mediator) turn out not to
take advantage of this device, so that the ﬁndings hold for the model without it.
2.3 Preliminary Observations
If the probability of state 1 is p, given the history hk, then the expected surplus (assuming
that the Firm takes an optimal eventual decision) is p · 1 + (1 − p) · 0 = p. This means that
continuation payoﬀs must satisfy
pV1(hk) + (1 − p)V0(hk) + W(hk) ≤ p. (2)
From any history onward, the Agent can secure a payoﬀ of zero, independently of her type:
V1(hk) ≥ 0,V0(hk) ≥ 0. (3)
is straightforward and omitted.
12The equilibrium we shall obtain is also an equilibrium of the inﬁnite-horizon, undiscounted game, but taking
limits allows us to uniquely pin down the limiting strategy proﬁle.
13The Firm, on the other hand, can secure a higher continuation payoﬀ. If it receives no further
information, it receives its outside option
w(p) = (p − γ (1 − p))
+ . (4)
Since additional information cannot hurt the Firm, this is a lower bound on W(hk).
It is easy to see that (2) (with p = p0), (3) and (4) deﬁne the set of feasible and individually
rational (continuation) payoﬀs. Note that the type-1 Agent cannot receive more than 1−w(p)/p,
the entire expected surplus. While this is the maximum she can hope for, this is still short of
the actual surplus, given state 1, 1−w(p); hence, even appropriating the entire expected surplus
does not solve the moral hazard in the decision problem altogether.
We conclude this section with a series of observations about the selling information game.
Fix K and p0 throughout.
- There exists an equilibrium (the “worst” equilibrium) that minmaxes both players simulta-
neously: Making no transfers (expecting none) and releasing no information is an equilibrium,
with payoﬀs
W = w(p0),V1 = V0 = 0.13
Although there are many ways for the Agent to signal her information through transfers or
deviations in terms of the test diﬃculty that she picks, and therefore, many out-of-equilibrium
beliefs to “worry” about, such beliefs play no role: observable deviations by the Firm do not
aﬀect its beliefs (this is the “no signalling what you don’t know” ingredient of perfect Bayesian
equilibrium), and observable deviations by the Agent can be deterred through the threat of
reverting to this worst equilibrium, independently of how this aﬀects the Firm’s belief.14
An equilibrium is eﬃcient if the constraint (2) is binding, that is, if the type-1 Agent discloses
all her information eventually, on the equilibrium path.
- If an equilibrium gives (V0,V1) to the Agent, there is an eﬃcient equilibrium that does so:
13For brevity, we often write Vω for Vω(hk), but because the maximum equilibrium payoﬀ only depends on the
Firm’s belief (and the number of periods left), we also sometimes write Vω(p), where p is this belief. Finally, we
also write Vω for the resulting function of the belief. Hopefully, no confusion will arise.
14This also implies that the equilibrium payoﬀs that we shall determine can easily be obtained as well for
alternative orders of moves within a period, such as disclosure before transfer, etc.
14Indeed, the Agent can always disclose the state in the last period on the equilibrium path. This
cannot weaken the incentives for the players to carry out the planned transfers (because it can
only increase the payoﬀ from following the speciﬁed equilibrium actions), but it guarantees that
the correct action is taken.15
Some eﬃcient equilibrium payoﬀs giving all the surplus to one of the parties are easy to
describe.
- There is an equilibrium in which the Firm receives W0 = p0: no transfers are ever made,
and the type-1 Agent reveals the state in the last period, so that the posterior belief is 1 with
probability p0, and 0 otherwise.
- There is an equilibrium in which the Agent’s expected payoﬀ is p0V1+(1 − p0)V0 = p0−w(p0):
the Firm pays this amount in the ﬁrst period, and the Agent reveals the state. If the Firm fails
to pay, or the Agent deviates, play reverts to the worst equilibrium.
This shows that attaining the maximum expected payoﬀ of the informed player is trivial in
our game, unlike in many games with incomplete information (see Aumann and Maschler, 1995).
Note also that, since the type-1 Agent can always mimic the type-0 Agent, her payoﬀ must be
at least as high as the type-0’s payoﬀ. This implies that the maximal equilibrium payoﬀ for the
type-0’s Agent is the one that maximizes the Agent’s ex ante payoﬀ, as described above.
However, all these equilibria are terrible for providing incentives to acquire information: in
all of them the two types of the Agent earn the same payoﬀ and hence there is no return to the
eﬀort. What is non-trivial is to identify an equilibrium that maximizes V1 −V0, the diﬀerence in
payoﬀs of the two types. We now argue that maximizing V1 among all equilibria is “equivalent”
to maximizing V1+W, the sum of the Firm’s and type-1 Agent’s payoﬀ, as well as to maximizing
V1 − V0:
- An equilibrium that maximizes V1 also maximizes V1 + W over all equilibria: Given some
15This is clear if only at most the Agent randomizes on path, as her payoﬀ from releasing additional information
at the end does not aﬀect her incentives. If the Firm is supposed to randomize on path, there exists an equivalent
equilibrium that takes advantage of the public randomization device in which, conditional on the device’s outcome,
its action is pure, and so its incentives from following the equilibrium action are reinforced by this additional
disclosure. This is the only point in the analysis in which the relaxation (to a game with a public randomization
device) is used.
15equilibrium yielding payoﬀs (V0,V1,W), note that
V1 + W ≤ V1 + w(p0).
Otherwise, by simply starting from the equilibrium that yields V1 to the type-1 Agent and W
to the Firm, and by increasing the initial transfer that the Firm is asked to make by an amount
W −w (p0), we would obtain another equilibrium in which the type-1 Agent gets a payoﬀ strictly
above V1 –a contradiction. Given that w(p0) is ﬁxed, the conclusion follows.
Therefore, the equilibrium that maximizes the type-1 Agent’s payoﬀ cannot leave any surplus
to the Firm.
- An equilibrium that maximizes V1 also maximizes V1 − V0: Eﬃcient equilibria, to which
attention can be restricted to, satisfy
p0V1 + (1 − p0)V0 + W = p0, (5)
so that
V1 − V0 =
V1 + W − p0
1 − p0
.
Thus, given the prior belief p0, maximizing the payoﬀ diﬀerence V1−V0 is equivalent to maximiz-
ing the sum V1 + W, but as we have already remarked, this is in turn implied by maximizing V1
only. Therefore, we can simplify further and focus on maximizing V1, the type-1 Agent’s payoﬀ.
- The set of equilibrium payoﬀs is non-decreasing in K, the number of rounds: players can
always choose not to make transfers or disclose any information in the ﬁrst round.
Hence, the highest equilibrium payoﬀ for the type-1 Agent has a well-deﬁned limit given p0




1 are the (pointwise) limit payoﬀs (as p0
varies) in pure, mixed unobservable, and mixed observable strategies, that we shall consider in
turn.
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Figure 1: A feasible action
3 Equilibrium Analysis
We now turn to the focus of the analysis: what equilibrium maximizes the payoﬀ of the type-1
Agent, and how much of the surplus can she appropriate?
3.1 Pure Strategies
We start by considering pure strategies by the Agent. A pure strategy calls for the Agent to
disclose a speciﬁc piece of information at each round, i.e. for both types to choose a test with
a particular equilibrium-path m and for type-1 to pass it for sure and type-0 to pass it with
probability m.
This implies that, from the Firm’s point of view, and ignoring the uninteresting case in which
the Agent is supposed to reveal nothing (m = 1), its posterior will take one of two values: either
it will jump from p0 up to some p′, if the piece of information is revealed. Or it will jump down to
zero. This is illustrated in Figure 1. The two arrows indicate the two possible posterior beliefs.
Note that, as a stochastic process, and viewed from the Firm’s perspective, this belief must follow
a martingale: the Firm’s expectation of its posterior belief must be equal to its prior belief. This
is not the case, however, from the Agent’s point of view. Given her knowledge of the state, she
assigns diﬀerent probabilities to these posterior beliefs than the Firm. If she is the type-1 Agent,
she knows for sure that the belief will not decrease over time. If she is the type-0 Agent, the
expectation of the posterior belief is below p0 (the process is then a supermartingale).
More generally, an equilibrium outcome speciﬁes a martingale splitting, summarized by the
17sequence of Firm’s beliefs that the state is 1, conditional on all pieces of information having
been exhibited up that round (all test diﬃculties chosen and the results of the tests). On the
equilibrium path, as long as the Agent passes the tests, Firm’s beliefs follow a non-decreasing
sequence {p0,...,pK+1} which starts at the Firm’s prior belief, p0, and ends up at pK+1 = 1
(assuming, without loss, that the equilibrium is eﬃcient). If a piece of information fails to be
disclosed (i.e. the Agent fails a test), the posterior immediately drops to zero.
Of course, an equilibrium must also specify transfers, as well as how players behave oﬀ the
equilibrium path. The most eﬀective punishment for deviations (whether in terms of information
disclosure or payment) is reversion to the worst equilibrium, and this is assumed throughout.
It turns out that type-1 Agent payoﬀ decreases if the Firm is given any payoﬀ in excess of
its outside option in this or future periods. It is obvious for the ﬁrst round, since the payoﬀs
are transferred one-to-one between the Firm and the Agent. On the one hand, the Agent could
demand more in earlier rounds by promising surplus to the Firm in later rounds. On the other
hand, the willingness-to-pay of the Firm for this future surplus is lower than the cost to the type-
1 Agent of promising this surplus. The reason is that the Firm assigns a lower probability than
the type-1 Agent to the posterior increasing (and promising surplus after the posterior drops to
zero is not incentive compatible).
Therefore, if the Firm’s belief in the next round is either pk+1, or 0, given the current belief
pk, then the Firm is willing to pay
EF[w(p
′)] − w(pk),
where p′ is the (random) belief in the next round, with possible values 0 and pk+1, and EF [·] is
the expectation operator for the Firm. The Agent does not make any transfers. In other words,
the Agent extracts the maximal payment she can hope for from the Firm at every round. This
sounds intuitive, but as we shall see, this will no longer be optimal when a more general class of
mechanism is considered.
This leaves us with the determination of the sequence of posterior beliefs.
We already know that it is possible for the Agent to appropriate some of the value of her
18information, but the question is whether she can get more than p0−w(p0), which is just as much
as the type-0 Agent gets in the equilibrium we constructed so far.
Unless the Agent can reveal the information slowly, the answer is negative: If K = 1, the
highest equilibrium payoﬀ to the type-1 Agent is equal to p0 − w(p0). With one round of
communication, the payoﬀ of the Agent can come only from the payment in the ﬁrst (and only)
round. Therefore, the payoﬀs of the two types of Agents have to be the same in all equilibria (for
K = 1). To identify the best for the type-1 Agent, recall that we can focus on eﬃcient equilibria,
in which the posterior is either 0 or p1 = 1. Because beliefs must follow a martingale from the








This means that the additional value from this information, relative to what the Firm can secure,
is
EF[w(p
′)] − w(p0) =
p0
p1
w(p1) − w(p0) = p0 − w(p0).
Note that, when p0 ≤ p∗, the highest payoﬀ in one round that the type-1 Agent can get in
equilibrium is simply the prior p0. Note also that this payoﬀ is increasing in p0 ≤ p∗.
This immediately suggests one way to improve on the payoﬀ with as little as two rounds. In
the ﬁrst step, the Agent discloses for free the piece of information leading to a posterior belief
of p∗ (or 0, if she fails to do so). In the second round, the equilibrium of the one-round game is





The right panel of Figure 2 illustrates. The lower kinked line is the outside option w, the upper
straight line is total surplus, p. Hence, the payment in the second round is given by the length
of the vertical segment at p∗ in the right panel, which is clearly larger than the payment with
only one round, given by the length of the vertical segment at p0.
Is the splitting that we described optimal with two periods to go? As it turns out, it is so if
and only if p0 < (p∗)
2. But there are many other ways of splitting information with two periods








Figure 2: Revealing information in two steps
to go that improve upon the one-round equilibrium, and among them, splits that also improve
over the one-period equilibrium when p0 > p∗. The optimal strategy will be given at the end of
this subsection.
Allowing additional rounds will further improve what the type-1 Agent can achieve. This
can be understood graphically. Consider Figure 3. As shown on the left panel, information is
revealed in three steps. First, the belief is split into 0 and p∗. Second, at p∗ (assuming this belief
is reached), it is split in 0 and p′. Finally, at p′, it is split in 0 and 1. The right panel shows
how to determine the type-1 Agent’s payoﬀ graphically. The two solid (red) segments represent
the maximal payments that the type-1 Agent can demand at each round for the information
that is being released in the second and third round. (In the ﬁrst round, no payment can be
demanded, because if future payments drive down the Firm’s continuation payoﬀ from the second
round onward to its outside option, its continuation payoﬀ is zero whether its posterior goes up
or down). Thus, the sum of their lengths is the payoﬀ of the type-1 Agent. In contrast, in
the equilibrium involving two rounds only, in which information is fully disclosed once the belief
reaches p∗, the payment to the Agent is only equal to the distance of the vertical segment between
the outside option w at p∗ and the chord connecting (0,0) and (1,1) evaluated at p∗ (i.e., the
lower segment, plus the dotted segment). It is clear that the proﬁt with three rounds exceeds
the proﬁt with only two, as the chords from the origin to the point (p,w(p)) become steeper as
20✻
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Figure 3: Revealing information in three steps: evolution (left) and payoﬀ (right)
p increases.
It is intuitively clear that further splitting information is beneﬁcial, if possible. Figure 4
illustrates the total payoﬀ that results from a splitting that involves many small steps (which is
the sum of all vertical segments). The Reader might be tempted to conject that, in the limit as
K → ∞, the type-1 Agent will be able to extract the full value of the information. The right
panel explains why this conjecture is incorrect. As the Firm’s belief goes from p − dp to p, its
outside option increases from w(p−dp) to w(p), yet the type-1 Agent only charges a fraction of
this, giving up w(p)dp/p in this process. This loss, or foregone proﬁt, need not be large when
the step size dp is small, but then again, the smaller the step size, the larger the number of steps
that the disclosure policy involves. As a result, the type-1 Agent cannot avoid but to give up
a fraction of the value of the information. Note that this sacriﬁced proﬁt does not beneﬁt the
Firm, which is always charged its full willingness-to-pay. Therefore, it beneﬁts the type-0 Agent,
whose proﬁt does not tend to zero, even as the number of rounds goes to inﬁnity.
What does the maximum payoﬀ converge to as the number of rounds increase? Here is a
heuristic derivation of the solution. Note that, for p ≥ p∗, the payment that the type-1 Agent can
extract from the Firm if the following posterior belief is p′ ∈ {0,p+dp} is (observing that, from
21✻ ✻
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Figure 4: Revealing information in many steps (left); Foregone proﬁt at each step (right)





w(p + dp) − w(p) =
p
p + dp





where O(x) < M|x| for some constant M and all x. If the entire interval [p∗,1] is divided in this






= γ(ln1 − lnp
∗) = −γ lnp
∗.
This suggests that the limiting payoﬀ is independent of the exact way in which information
(above p∗) is divided up over time, as long as the mesh of the partition tends to zero.




1 (p0) := −γ lnp
∗.
This lemma will follow as immediate corollary from the next one. Note that this payoﬀ is
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Figure 5: Revealing information in many steps (left); Payoﬀ as a function of K (right).
independent of p0 (for p0 < p∗). Indeed, the ﬁrst chunk of information, leading to a posterior
belief of p∗, is given away for free. It does not aﬀect the Firm’s outside option, but it makes the
Firm as unsure as can be about what it is the right decision. From that point on, the Agent
starts selling information in excruciatingly small bits, leaving no surplus whatsoever to the Firm,
as in the left panel of Figure 5.
We conclude this subsection by the explicit description of the equilibrium that achieves the
maximum payoﬀ of the type-1 Agent, as a function of the number of rounds and the prior belief
p0. Here, (x)− := −min{0,x} ≥ 0.
Lemma 2 The maximal equilibrium payoﬀ of the type-1 Agent with K rounds, given the Firm’s







0 ) − (p0 − γ(1 − p0))− if p0 ≥ (p∗)
K
K−1,
V1,K−1(p∗) if p0 < (p∗)
K
K−1,
for K > 1, with V1,1 (p0) = γ(1 − p0) − (p0 − γ(1 − p0))−. On the equilibrium path, in the initial








0 if p0 ≥ (p∗)
K
K−1,
p∗ if p0 < (p∗)
K
K−1,
23after which the play proceeds as in the best equilibrium with K − 1 rounds, given prior p1.
Note that, ﬁxing p0 < p∗, and letting K → ∞, it holds that p0 < (p∗)
K
K−1 for all K large
enough, so that, with enough rounds ahead, it is optimal to set p1 = p∗ in the ﬁrst, and then




K ,...,1, and the sequence of posteriors
successively used becomes dense in [p∗,1]. Therefore, with suﬃciently many rounds, the equilib-
rium involves progressive disclosure of information, with a ﬁrst big step leading to the posterior
belief p∗, given the prior belief p0 < p∗, followed by a succession of very small disclosures, leading
the Firm’s belief gradually up all the way to one. The right panel of Figure 5 shows how the
payoﬀ varies with K.
Note also that, for any K and any equilibrium, if p and p′ > p are beliefs on the equilibrium
path, then V0(p′) − V1(p′) ≤ V0(p) − V1(p), as long as only the Firm makes payments. Indeed,
going from p to p′, the type-1 Agent forfeits the payments that the Firm might have made over
this range of beliefs (hence V1(p′) < V1(p)), while the type-0 Agent only forfeits them in the
event that she is able to produce the relevant information: hence she loses less, and might even
gain (for instance, she might not have been able to produce the ﬁrst piece of evidence that is
given away at p < p∗). As a result, and quite generally, the type-1 Agent has a preference for
lower beliefs, relative to the type-0 Agent. Having to give away information is more costly to
an Agent who knows that she owns it. This plays an important role in the analysis of mixed
strategies that we do next.
An implication of this analysis is that, with pure strategies, there is no role for payments
going from the Agent to the Firm. We believe, but have not shown, that the converse also holds,
and that, without payments from the Agent to the Firm, one cannot improve on the equilibrium
in pure strategies.
3.2 Mixed Strategies
We now consider mixed strategies by the Agent. Speciﬁcally, consider the following scenario.
The type-1 Agent passes the test with positive but non-unitary probability; that is, she ﬂunks
on purpose some of the time. The type-0 Agent passes the test whenever she is able to. This
24requires (i) the type-1 Agent to be indiﬀerent between the two resulting continuations, and (ii)
the type-0 Agent to (weakly) prefer not ﬂunking the test.
In this case, failure to exhibit information does not lead to a posterior of zero. Indeed, the
type-1 Agent might conceivably mix in such a way that exhibiting information leads to a lower
posterior (though this won’t occur in the analysis).
Whether one views mixed strategies as plausible in their own right or not, such dynamics of
beliefs would also result from pure strategies with an appropriately extended set of actions: if the
Agent can commit to run a test which is noisy (e.g., applying her expertise to a particular task, or
letting the Firm experiment with, or make measurements of, her invention), the posterior belief
will not necessarily drop to zero after a failure (operating systems do crash occasionally). In fact,
such tests endow the Agent with even more commitment than mixed strategies as considered here,
as they do not require the Agent to be indiﬀerent over the resulting outcomes. The importance
of such commitment will be evaluated in the next subsection.
One might wonder what the type-1 Agent could gain from using mixed strategies. The ratio-
nale is actually well-known. The type-1 Agent and the Firm have both diﬀerences in preferences
over posterior beliefs, and diﬀerences in beliefs about the event that these posterior beliefs ma-
terialize. The next subsection will show how to take advantage of the heterogeneity in beliefs.
Mixed strategies take advantage of the heterogeneity in preferences.
To illustrate this, consider the case in which γ = 1, so that p∗ = 1/2, and consider the limiting
case K = ∞, for simplicity. Using the best equilibrium (for the type-1 Agent) as a benchmark,
the preferences of the Firm are piecewise aﬃne in p (w(p) = (2p − 1)+). Meanwhile, the type-1
Agent has a payoﬀ function that is convex in p (over [1,2/1]), given by −lnp. We shall use
side bets to take advantage of this diﬀerential attitude towards the resolution of uncertainty. Of
course, if the type-1 Agent gains from such side bets, and the Firm does not lose from them (as
its payoﬀ is already down to its outside option), it must be that the type-0 Agent loses. Her
payoﬀ function is given by V0(p) = 1 + (plnp)/(1 − p). See the left panel of Figure 6.
Side bets, however, require payments to go back and forth between the Firm and the Agent.16
16As mentioned, we do not know what payoﬀs can be obtained if mixed strategies are allowed, but payments
from the Agent to the Firm are not. We cannot rule out that some of the back payments of the bets could take
the form of deductions on later payments by the Firm, but is unclear how far such deductions could substitute
25If the Firm pays more than the “fundamental” expected value of the information disclosed, in
anticipation of the returns of such side bets, it had better be that the Agent has incentives to
honor such payments if necessary. If the posterior belief dropped to zero, even the threat of
reversion to the worst equilibrium could not discipline the Agent into paying back. Therefore,
the stakes of such bets are limited on two accounts: the type-0 Agent should be willing to make
the requisite payments if the case occurs, and the type-1 Agent must be indiﬀerent between
the two continuation equilibria. Note that, if the type-1 Agent is indiﬀerent between the two
continuations, the type-0 Agent prefers the one starting with the higher posterior belief, given
their relative preferences over starting beliefs, so that the type-0 Agent will disclose the requisite
information, whenever she is able to (as we argued at the end of the previous subsection).
The left panel of Figure 6 illustrates how the mixing works, starting from a given belief
p > 1/2. If information is disclosed, the Firm becomes more optimistic, with a corresponding
posterior of p + ∆, for some ∆ > 0. If it does not, the Firm becomes more pessimistic, with a
posterior of p−∆ > 1/2: the type-1 Agent randomizes in the right proportion for this posterior to
arise, given that the type-0 Agent will disclose the information whenever she is able to. Because
the possible posterior beliefs are symmetric around p, the two events (that information gets
disclosed or not) must be equally likely from the Firm’s point of view.
The Agent is expected to pay the Firm an amount X > 0 if the event p′ = p − ∆ realizes.
We must set X so that type-1 Agent is willing to randomize. Assuming that after this payment
play resumes according to the best pure strategy equilibrium described above, the continuation
payoﬀs after this payment are −ln(p + ∆) and −ln(p − ∆) respectively; hence, we must set
X = ln(p + ∆) − ln(p − ∆). As mentioned, because V0 − V1 (the diﬀerence in payoﬀs in the
best equilibrium) is increasing in p, this implies that the type-0 Agent discloses the information
whenever she is able to. We must also pick ∆ suﬃciently small to ensure that V0(p − ∆) ≥ X,
so that the type-0 Agent will not renege on the payment. Because, by deﬁnition of X, X = 0
when ∆ = 0, it is possible to ﬁnd a small enough ∆ > 0 for this to hold.
Because both posterior beliefs are equally likely, the Firm is willing to pay X/2 upfront in
for explicit payments by the Agent.
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Figure 6: Construction of the side bet (left); Maximum limit payoﬀ V m
1 + w, γ = 1 (right).
exchange for this contingent future payment. This gives a total payoﬀ of
ˆ V1(p) :=
ln(p + ∆) − ln(p − ∆)
2
+ ln(p − ∆) = −
ln(p + ∆) + ln(p − ∆)
2
> −lnp
to the type-1 Agent, where the second term is the continuation payoﬀ from the next round onward
(which is equal across posterior beliefs, by construction), and the strict inequality follows from
Jensen’s inequality.
We have just improved on our upper bound based on pure strategies. The key here was
the convexity of the type-1 Agent, relative to the Firm’s payoﬀ function (i.e. the convexity of
w(p) + V1 (p)). What is the limit of using such mixing/side bets to improve V1?
Let V m
0 (p) and V m
1 (p) denote the limiting payoﬀs as K → ∞ in the best equilibrium that
uses mixed (or pure) strategies and deﬁne h(p) := V m
1 (p)+w(p). There are two possibilities that
could prevent an extra round with side bets to improve upon a given equilibrium payoﬀ. Either
V m
0 (p) = 0 at some p, so that by feasibility and individual rationality h(p) = 1 − (1 − p)w(p)/p
and it cannot increase any more. Or, h(p) is locally concave, preventing further improvements
through side bets. As we add rounds with the side-bets the diﬀerence in curvatures of V1 (p) and
w(p) goes down. Does it vanish before we reduce V0 (p) down to zero?
27Other than these two bounds on h (that it has to be either equal to the upper bound or
locally concave) we additionally know that h cannot be steeper than w(p)/p: indeed, starting
from p0, we can always use a pure-strategy with posterior beliefs in {0,p1}, so that
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m













Finally, h must exceed w, as the type-1 Agent’s payoﬀ is non-negative. What is the lowest











1 + γ −
√
γ) − w(p) if p < pm :=
√
p∗,
1 − w(p)/p if p ≥ pm.
See the right panel of Figure 6. In Appendix, we prove that this is the limit maximum equilibrium
payoﬀ of the type-1 Agent with mixed strategies.17 That is, full extraction occurs for high enough
(p ≥ pm, in which case V0 (p) = 0) but not for low beliefs. Still, this is a marked improvement
upon pure strategies.
The following corollary records the limiting value for prior beliefs below p∗.
Lemma 3 As K → ∞, the maximum payoﬀ to the type-1 Agent in mixed strategies tends to,
for p0 < p∗,
V
m








Mixed strategies only allowed us to take advantage of the diﬀerences between the Firm and
the type-1 Agent as long as their preferences had diﬀerent curvatures. This constrains how much
17Roughly, any function satisfying these properties cannot be improved upon with one more round, even with
mixed strategies. Because the payoﬀ of the type-1 Agent is increasing in her continuation payoﬀ, this means
that the highest limiting payoﬀ must be below this function. Conversely, the limiting payoﬀ must satisfy these
properties. Hence, it follows that this lowest function is the limiting payoﬀ.
28surplus can be channeled from the type-0 Agent to the type-1 Agent. While the type-1 Agent
and the Firm had diﬀerent beliefs regarding the occurrence of future events –in particular, the
Firm’s next belief– such diﬀerences could not be leveraged, because the type-1 Agent had to be
indiﬀerent over both continuations, so that it did not matter for the type-1 Agent how likely
each posterior belief was.
If the Agent could commit to such a mixed action, this constraint no longer applies. As
usual, this is a matter of the deﬁnition of what is observable: in the case of random, but
informative tests, all parties could observe that the Agent is running such a test, and the Agent
would no longer be in control of its outcome. The previous subsection considered unobservable
mixed actions. Alternatively, if the Agent delegates the decision to disclose the information to a
disinterested third party –what we call an intermediary– the Agent can no longer control whether
the information gets disclosed or not.
In this section, we allow such an intermediary. Formally, we drop the requirement that the
Agent be indiﬀerent over the actions in the support of her mixed strategy. As we argue, this
allows the type-1 Agent to further improve on her payoﬀ. The key still lies in the design of side
bets. This time around, those bets take advantage of the diﬀerence in beliefs.
Consider the simple example in which γ = 1, so that p∗ = 1/2. The right panel of Figure 7
illustrates one of the procedures that the intermediary may follow, starting from a given belief
p0 = 1/3. Here, the intermediary sends one of two messages, low or high. The high message
makes the Firm more optimistic, with a corresponding posterior of 1/2. The low message makes
the Firm more pessimistic, with a posterior of 1/6. Because the Firm’s belief is a martingale,
and because p0 = 1/3 is the mean of 1/2 and 1/6, the two messages must be equally likely from
the Firm’s point of view.
How likely is each message from the type-1 Agent’s point of view? Note that the low posterior,
1/6, is half as high as the prior belief, 1/3. This means that, from the Firm’s point of view,
the low message is half as likely to be observed when the state is ω = 1, as the high message.
Because it assigns an unconditional probability of 1/2 to the low message, it must then assign
probability 1/2 · 1/2 = 1/4 to this low message conditional on the Agent being of type 1. This
is then the probability that the type-1 Agent must assign to this low message.
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(1 − p)V0 V0
Figure 7: The Role of Side Bets
The left panel of Figure 7 depicts the three continuation payoﬀs in the best pure-strategy






= −γ lnp∗ = ln2, the Firm receives w(1/6) = 0, yet the sum of all three payoﬀs must
equal the surplus p = 1/6, so that the type-0’s Agent payoﬀ can be read oﬀ the y-axis as shown.











Consider then the following scheme when there are arbitrarily many rounds. In the second





to the Firm if and only if
the realized message is low (in particular, there is no payment by the Agent to the Firm if the
realized message is high). Aside from this one-time, conditional payment from the Agent to the
Firm, all payments by the Firm to the Agent, and all information disclosures from the Agent to
the Firm occur from the second round onward as in the pure-strategy equilibrium without an
intermediary (which is obviously possible even with an intermediary), given the realized message.
In the initial round, before the message is sent, the Firm must pay the diﬀerence between its
expected continuation payoﬀ and its current outside option, 0. (If it fails to do so, we switch to
the worst equilibrium, as usual). How much is the Firm willing to pay? Note that, if there was
no payment from the Agent to the Firm conditional on a low message, it is not willing to pay












/2 upfront in this scheme. How much is this scheme worth to the type-1 Agent?
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, the equality follows. As a result, with this





, her maximal payoﬀ without an
intermediary.
This scheme is nothing but a bet, or a trade, between two agents whose beliefs about some
event diﬀer. The type-1 Agent attaches probability 1/4 to the event that the Firm’s posterior
belief will be 1/6, while the Firm attaches probability 1/2 to this event. Therefore, there is
room for a proﬁtable trade, and the only bound on this trade is that the bet cannot exceed the
type-0’s continuation payoﬀ. Note that the type-0 Agent loses from this scheme (as compared
to our original equilibrium), for she is the one who assigns a high probability to the event that
the posterior is 1/6. Still, her payoﬀ remains positive, and she has no choice but to go along
(her payoﬀ is equal to the Firm’s payment in the initial period plus the expected payoﬀ from
reaching the higher posterior).
Observe that such a scheme is not possible without an intermediary, because the type-1 Agent
is not indiﬀerent over realized messages. She strictly prefers the high message to obtain, so that
such a scheme cannot be replicated by mixed strategies without an intermediary.18 Second, note
that the payment that the Agent makes if a low message occurs is not informative per se. This is
because this payment is no larger than V0, and the continuation payoﬀs of the Agent is at least
18The payoﬀ that is used as continuation payoﬀ here –the maximum type-1 equilibrium payoﬀ in pure strategies–
is aﬃne over the beliefs considered; hence, mixed strategies (without an intermediary) cannot improve her payoﬀ,
since the type-1 Agent and the Firm have identical risk attitudes. Alternatively, we could have used as continuation
payoﬀ the maximum type-1 equilibrium payoﬀ in mixed strategies: because this payoﬀ is also constant over these
beliefs, and the type-0 Agent gets a positive payoﬀ, the same construction would work, and improve on this
maximum payoﬀ.
31as much, independently of her type. Higher payments would not work, because the type-0 Agent
would not be willing to make it given the continuation equilibrium, and so the occurrence of a
payment or not would convey information about the Agent’s type. From the left panel of Figure
7, it is clear that, the closer the expected payoﬀ pV1 of the type-1 Agent is to the total surplus
p, the smaller is the resulting V0, and so, the smaller the scope for such a scheme becomes. But
as long as V0 remains strictly positive, such schemes remain possible.
We concluded the previous subsection by noting the two constraints preventing full surplus
extraction. Here, only V0(p) ≥ 0 remains. Hence, it should be no surprise that such bets allow full
surplus extraction. The maximum equilibrium payoﬀ of the type-1 Agent tends to, as K → ∞,
V
int




giving us the following corollary:
Lemma 4 As K → ∞, the maximum equilibrium payoﬀ to the type-1 Agent with an intermedi-
ary tends to, for p0 < p∗,
V
int
1 (p0) = 1.
4 General Outside Options
How do our results depend on our assumptions on the outside option? While the piecewise
linear structure of the Firm’s payoﬀ proves quite convenient for explicit formulas, the main results
of Section 3 generalize to more general speciﬁcations.
Suppose that the payoﬀ of the Firm (gross of any transfers) as a function of its posterior belief
p after the K rounds is a non-decreasing continuous function w(p), and normalize w(0) = 0,
w(1) = 1. We further assume that w(p) ≤ p, for all p ∈ [0,1], for otherwise full information
disclosure is not socially desirable. These assumptions on w are maintained throughout the next
three subsections.
This payoﬀ can be thought as the reduced-form of some decision problem that the Firm
faces, as in our baseline model. In that case, w must be convex, but since we are taking w
32as a primitive here, we do not assume such a property here. We consider the three cases of
pure-strategy, mixed-strategy, and of an intermediary in turn.
4.1 Pure Strategies
Recall that the best equilibrium with many rounds called for a ﬁrst burst of information
released for free (assuming p < p∗), after which information is disclosed in dribs and drabs. One
might wonder whether this is a general phenomenon.
The answer, as it turns out, depends on the shape of the outside option. It is in the interest
of the type-1 Agent to split information as ﬁnely as possible for any prior belief p0 if and only
if the function w is star-shaped, i.e., if and only if the average, w(p)/p, is a strictly increasing
function of p.19 More generally, if a function is star-shaped on some intervals of beliefs, but not
on others, then information will be sold in small bits at a positive price for beliefs in the former
type of interval, and given away for free as a chunk in the latter. In our main example, w is
not star-shaped on [0,p∗], as the average value w(p)/p is constant (and equal to zero) over this
interval. However, it is star-shaped on [p∗,1]. Hence our ﬁnding.
Let us ﬁrst consider a star-shaped outside option. If in a given round the Firm’s belief goes
from p to either (p + dp) or 0, the Agent can charge up to
p
p + dp
w(p + dp) − w(p) = (w
′(p) − w(p)/p)dp + O(dp
2)
for it.20 Given the Firm’s prior belief p0, the type-1 Agent’s payoﬀ becomes then (in the limit,








which generalizes the formula that we have seen for the special case w(p) = (p − (1 − p)γ)+.21
19This condition already appears in the economics literature in the study of risk (see Landsberger and Meilijson,
1990). It is weaker than convexity: the function p  → pα is star-shaped for α > 1, but only convex for α ≥ 2.
20In case w (p) is not diﬀerentiable, then w′ (p) is the right-derivative, which is well-deﬁned in case w is star-
shaped.
21In our main example, w is (globally) weakly star-shaped: that is, the function p  → w(p)/p is only weakly
33That is, the type-1 Agent’s payoﬀ is the area between the marginal payoﬀ of the Firm and its
average payoﬀ.
To see that splitting information as ﬁnely as possible is best in that case, ﬁx some arbitrary
interval of beliefs [p, ¯ p], and consider the alternative strategy under which the posterior belief of
the Firm jump from p to ¯ p, the payoﬀ in that round is given by
p
¯ p
w(¯ p) − w(p).
If instead this interval of beliefs is split as ﬁnely as is possible, the payoﬀ over this range is
w(¯ p) − w(p) −





Hence, splitting is better if and only if
1
¯ p − p








which is satisﬁed if the average w(p)/p is increasing.
Equation (7) also explains why splitting information ﬁnely is not a good idea if the average
outside option is strictly decreasing over some range [p, ¯ p], as the inequality is reversed in that
case. What determines the jump? Note that, as mentioned, the payoﬀ from a jump is pw(¯ p)/¯ p−
w(p), while the marginal beneﬁt from ﬁnely splitting information disclosures at any given belief












See Figure 8. The left panel illustrates how having two rounds improves on one round. Starting
with a prior belief p0, the highest equilibrium payoﬀ the type-1 Agent can receive in one round
is given by the dotted black segment. If instead information is disclosed in two steps, with an
increasing. The formula for the maximum payoﬀ in the limit K → ∞ is the same whether there is a jump in the
ﬁrst period or not. But for any ﬁnite K, splitting information disclosures over the range [p0,p∗] is suboptimal, as
it is a “wasted period,” whose cost only vanishes in the limit.
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Figure 8: Splitting information with an arbitrary outside option
intermediate belief p1, the type-1 Agent’s payoﬀ becomes the sum of the two solid (red) segments,
which is strictly more, since w(p)/p is strictly increasing. The right panel illustrates the jump in
beliefs that occurs over the relevant interval when w(p)/p is not strictly increasing, as occurs in
our leading example for p < p∗.
There is a simple way to describe the maximum resulting payoﬀ. Given a non-negative
function f on [0,1], let
sha f
denote the largest weakly star-shaped function that is smaller than f. In light of the previous
discussion (see right panel of Figure 8), the following result should not be too unexpected.








where ˆ p0 := min{p ∈ [p0,1] : w(p) = sha w(p)}.
That is, the same formula as in the case of a star-shaped function applies, provided one applies
35it to the largest weakly star-shaped function that is smaller than w. The proof also elucidates
the structure of the optimal information disclosure policy, at least in the limit. Let
Iw := cl {p ∈ [0,1] : sha w(p) = w(p) and w(p)/p is strictly increasing at p}.
In our main example, sha w(p) = w(p) for all p, but Iw = [1/2,1]. Then the set of on-path beliefs
as K → ∞ held by the ﬁrm is contained, and dense, in Iw if Iw  = ∅. If Iw = ∅, any policy is
optimal.
Note that this result immediately implies that the highest payoﬀ to the type-1 Agent is higher,
the lower the outside option w. That is, if we consider two functions w, ˜ w such that w ≥ ˜ w,
then the corresponding payoﬀs satisfy V
p
1 ≤ ˜ V
p
1 . The “favorite” outside option for the Agent
is w(p) = 0 for all p < 1, and w(1) = 1 (though this does not quite satisfy our maintained
continuity assumptions). In that case, the type-1 Agent appropriates the entire surplus. This
is the case considered in the literature on “zero-knowledge proofs:” the revision in the Firm’s
belief that successive information disclosures entail does not aﬀect its willingness-to-pay.
4.2 Mixed Strategies
The description of the maximum payoﬀ is somewhat more complicated in this case, and we
restrict attention in this section to the case in which w is weakly star-shaped.
As discussed in the main example, the (limiting) maximum payoﬀ function V1 must obey
several constraints. Stated equivalently in terms of the function h = V1 +w, it must be the case
that:
1. The function h is no steeper than p  → w(p)/p, as explained in Subsection 3.2;22
2. The function h is bounded above, because V0 is non-negative:




22Formally, (6) holds for all p0,p1.
363. On any interval in which h < ¯ h, h must be weakly concave;
4. The function h weakly exceeds w, because V1 is non-negative.
Note that, from the deﬁnition of ¯ h, it is no steeper than p  → w(p)/p, because w is star-
shaped. Hence, whenever h = ¯ h, h also satisﬁes the ﬁrst requirement. In particular, the function
¯ h satisﬁes all four requirements, but it is generally not the only function that does (cf. our main
example).
The only constraint that might not be obvious is the third, brieﬂy mentioned in Subsection
3.2. Let us illustrate its necessity via a simple example. Suppose that h is not concave, i.e. there








Assume, in addition, that V0(p1) > V1(p1) − V1(p2) (this is not implied by h(p) ≤ ¯ h, but see
below). We construct a bet that strictly improves on V1(p) with one more period. Suppose that
the agent pays V1(p1) − V1(p2) to the principal if and only if the posterior drops to p1, and that
play reverts then (or if the posterior belief turns out to be p2) according to the equilibrium that
achieves V1. Note that the type-1 Agent is indiﬀerent between both posterior beliefs, and so is
willing to randomize. Given her assessment of the likelihood of each of these events, the Firm is
willing to pay upfront, given its prior p,
p2 − p
p2 − p1




as this is the diﬀerence between its expected continuation payoﬀ and its current outside option.
The type-1 Agent’s payoﬀ ˆ V1(p) consists then of this payment and her continuation payoﬀ V1(p2),
so that, adding up,
h(p) ≥ ˆ V1(p) + w(p) =
p2 − p
p2 − p1











37Note that the constraint V0(p1) > V1(p1) − V1(p2) is always satisﬁed if p1,p2 are close enough to
p and V0(p1) > 0, and so h must be locally concave at any p at which V0(p) > 0.23
Let hm be the smallest function satisfying the four requirements above (which is well-deﬁned,
as the lower envelope of functions satisfying the requirements satisﬁes them as well). The fol-
lowing theorem elucidates the role of hm.
Theorem 2 Assume that w is weakly star-shaped. As K → ∞, the maximum payoﬀ to the
type-1 Agent in mixed strategies tends to:
V
m
1 (p0) = h
m(p0) − w(p0).
4.3 Intermediary
Finally, we come back to the case in which the Agent can commit to mixed actions, perhaps
because such mixed actions are observable. The maximum payoﬀ has its simplest expression in
this case, and the result does not require to assume that w is star-shaped.
As in the main example, the next theorem is established by considering (local) bets that take
advantage of the diﬀerence in beliefs between the type-1 Agent and the Firm, and that can be
constructed as long as V0 > 0. In this way, the type-1 Agent can extract all the surplus, from
the type-0 Agent as well as of the Firm, up to its outside option.









We described ways for self-enforcing contracts based on gradual persuasion/communication
and possibly mixed strategies and side bets to help resolve the moral hazard/holdup problem
23This hinges on continuity of V1 and V0; V1 is continuous because it is always possible to use the same disclosure
strategy starting at p2 as the continuation strategy given p1 would specify from the ﬁrst posterior belief above
p2 onward; the ﬁrst payment must be adjusted, but the continuity in payoﬀs as p1 → p2 then follows from the
continuity of w. Continuity of V0 follows then from the continuity of V1.
38in one-shot interaction to acquire information. Clearly, in real-life applications these kinds of
contracts can be aided by repeated interactions and reputation building.
Although it may not appear that way at ﬁrst glance, we claim that the model is quite robust,
as we discuss the following extensions.
1. It is an important assumption in our model that we are selling information rather than a
service or a physical good, since that allows us to assume that the transaction (i.e. taking
the test) does not have any physical cost to the Agent. If taking tests was costly, to preserve
results we would need to assume that taking a test is contractible and that ﬂunking the
test on purpose is as costly for the type-1 as passing it. If tests were not contractible
the standard hold-up problem would apply: in the last round of transactions the Agent
would always renege on taking the test and hence the Firm would never pay for it, and
the equilibrium would unravel. Che and S´ akovics (2004) suggests the following solution
to this known problem: if we relax the equilibrium concept to be an epsilon-equilibrium
and assume that easier tests are proportionally less expensive (for example, if we interpret
harder tests as taking many easier tests at once), then splitting tests would allo! w to resolve
that aspect of hold-up and hence gradualism would have an additional and independent
beneﬁt for sustaining good equilibria (this rationale resolves the problem of the Agent
holding up the Firm, while our results are about resolving the opposite hold-up).
2. In our model it does not really matter that it is the Agent who chooses the diﬃculty of
the test. We would obtain the same results in case the Firm was choosing the diﬃculty.
What is important, however, is that either taking the test itself in not contractible or that
the Agent has the option of ﬂunking the test on purpose. The reason is that otherwise the
Firm would deviate to paying nothing in all but the last round and then oﬀer an epsilon
contingent on the Agent taking the hardest test. It would not be a proﬁtable deviation in
our equilibria since there the Agent would respond by taking the money and ﬂunking the
test for sure.
3. Suppose that there is discounting with every round of communication, and the Firm can
decide to take its investment decision before the K rounds are over. Then it is no longer true
39that adding another round of communication will strictly increase the Agent’s maximum
equilibrium payoﬀ. This is both because the Agent faces a trade-oﬀ between collecting
more money overall and collecting it earlier, and because the Firm will ultimately prefer
to take its outside option rather than wait for another period, once the possible beneﬁts
from waiting become too small. Hence, in the best equilibrium, the number of rounds in
which communication actually takes place is bounded, so that the exact number of rounds
available will be of no importance, provided that there are suﬃciently many of them.
However, as long as the players are not too impatient, the best equilibrium still involves a
gradual release of information, and the number of rounds of active communication increases
with the discount factor. While this version with discounting does not lend itself to closed-
form formulas, it is easy to see that, as the discount factor approaches one, the payoﬀ
to the type-1 Agent must tend to the payoﬀ in the undiscounted game. Furthermore,
in our leading example, numerical simulations show that for the pure-strategy case this
convergence occurs at a geometric rate.
4. Suppose that the Agent cares to some extent that the Firm takes the correct action (say,
ceteris paribus, her payoﬀ increases by some small ε > 0). Then, in the one-shot game, it
is dominant for the Agent to reveal all her information, and so the Firm will not make any
payment. This logic clearly extends to the ﬁnite horizon game, no matter how long the
horizon is. On the other hand, this unraveling argument does not extend to the inﬁnite-
horizon game (say, with little but positive discounting), and it is possible to construct
equilibria in our leading example in which the Agent is paid for a gradual release of infor-
mation. Of course, the value of ε does put bounds on how extreme the Firm’s posterior
belief can become before the Agent discloses all information. Nevertheless, our results are
robust, inasmuch as the maximal equilibrium payoﬀ to the type-1 Agent will be continuous
at ε = 0 (if we allow for discounting).
5. As we mentioned in the introduction, our gradual tests are related to the literature on
zero-knowledge proofs. The main diﬀerence between our paper and most of that literature
is that we assume that the Firm knows which actions are relevant and with every piece
of information its outside option changes, while in these other models although the Firm
40becomes more and more certain that the Agent knows that the state is 1, the Firm does
not know which action is optimal in that state. For example, our model ﬁts a situation
where the Agent may have information about a particular investment while in these other
models the Agent has information about some investment opportunity. This is also similar
to a model where an inventor shows elements of its invention to the Firm, but unless the
Firm learns all elements, it cannot “steal” the idea. Mapping this situation to our model
would mean that w(p) is constant for all p < 1 and increases discontinuously at 1. That
would su! ggest an immediate, familiar solution: the Agent should reveal almost all details
other than the “last key,” increasing the Firm’s posterior close to 1, and then sell just that
remaining piece. In our model that does not work since the information is valuable to the
Firm per se. It is possible that the two models could be much more similar if one assumed
that the Firm had done some research as well and may already know how to make some
of the elements of the invention. If so, then an inventor would always risk that by showing
additional elements to the Firm, she would make herself obsolete. However, since such a
model requires some private information on the side of the Firm, it would not be equivalent
to our model and the analysis of that situation remains an open question.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2 and Lemma 1
The proof of Lemma 2 is by induction on the number of rounds. Lemma 2 immediately
implies Lemma 1
Our induction hypothesis is that, with k ≥ 1 periods to go, and a prior belief p = p0, the





k ≥ p∗ (i.e. if p ≥ (p∗)
k
k−1 for k ≥ 2), and equal to p∗ otherwise.24 Further, the type-1 Agent’s
maximal payoﬀ with k rounds to go is equal to
V1,k(p) = kγ(1 − p
1/k) − (p − γ(1 − p))
− if p ≥ (p
∗)
k
k−1, and V1,k(p) = V1,k−1(p




24In this proof, when we say that the equilibrium involves setting the posterior belief p1, we mean that, from
the type-1 Agent’s point of view, the posterior belief will be p1, while from the point of view of the Firm, the
posterior belief will be a random variable p′ with possible values {0,p1}.
43Note that this claim implies that V1,k(p∗) = kγ
 
1 − (p∗)1/k 
. Finally, as part of our induction
hypothesis, we claim the following. Given some equilibrium, let X ≥ 0 denote the payoﬀ of the
Firm, net of its outside option, with k rounds left. That is, X := Wk(p) − w(p), where Wk(p) is
the Firm’s payoﬀ given the history leading to the equilibrium belief p with k rounds to go. Let
V1,k(p,X) be the maximal payoﬀ of the type-1 Agent over all such equilibria, with associated
belief p, and excess payoﬀ X promised to the Firm (set V1,k(p,X) := −∞ if no such equilibrium
exists). Then we claim that V1,k(p,X) ≤ V1,k(p)−X. We ﬁrst verify this with one round. Clearly,
if K = 1, it is optimal to set the posterior p1 equal to 1, which is p
K−1
K , the relevant speciﬁcation
given that p
0
1 = 1 ≥ p∗. The payoﬀ to the type-1 Agent is
V1,1 (p) = p − (p − γ(1 − p))
+ = γ(1 − p) − (p − γ(1 − p))
−,
as was to be shown. Note that this equilibrium is eﬃcient. This implies that V1,1(p,X) ≤
V1,1(p) − X, for all X ≥ 0, because any additional payoﬀ to the Firm must come as a reduction
of the net transfer from the Firm to the Agent.
Assume that this holds with k rounds to go, and consider the problem with k + 1 rounds.
Of course, we do not know (yet) whether, in the continuation game, the Firm will be held to its
outside option.
Note that the Firm assigns probability p/p1 to the event that its posterior belief p′ will be









This implies that, with k+1 rounds, the Firm is willing to pay at most ¯ tF
k+1 :=
p
p1 (w(p1) + X′)−
w(p), where X′ is the excess payoﬀ of the Firm with k rounds to go, given posterior belief p1.
Therefore, the payoﬀ to the type-1 Agent is at most







′) − w(p) + V1,k(p1) − X
′,
where the second inequality follows from our induction hypothesis. Note that, since p/p1 < 1,
44this is a decreasing function of X′: it is best to hold the Firm to its outside option when
the next round begins. Therefore, we maximize
p
p1w(p1) + V1,k(p1). Note ﬁrst that, given the
induction hypothesis, all values p1 ∈ [p,(p∗)
k
k−1) yield the same payoﬀ, because for any such p1,
V1,k(p1) = V1,k−1(p∗). The remaining analysis is now a simple matter of algebra. Note that, for
p1 ∈ [(p∗)
k
k−1,p∗) (which obviously requires p < p∗), the objective becomes (using the induction
hypothesis)
V1,k(p1) = kγ(1 − (p1)
1/k) − (p1 − γ(1 − p1))
−,
which is increasing in p1, so that the only candidate value for p1 in this interval is p1 = p∗.
Consider now picking p1 ≥ p∗. Then we maximize
p
p1
(p1 − γ(1 − p1)) + kγ(1 − p
1/k
1 ),
which admits a unique critical point p1 = p
k
k+1, achieving a payoﬀ equal to (k+1)γ(1−p1/(k+1))+
p − γ(1 − p) = (k + 1)γ(1 − p1/(k+1)). Note, however, that this critical point satisﬁes p1 ≥ p∗ if
and only if p ≥ (p∗)
k+1
k .
Therefore, the unique candidates for p1 are {p∗,max{p∗,p
k
k+1},1}. Observe that setting the
posterior belief p1 equal to max{p∗,p
k
k+1} does at least as well as choosing either p∗ or 1. This
establishes the optimality of the strategy, and the optimal payoﬀ for the type-1 Agent, with k+1
rounds to go.
Finally, we must verify that V1,k+1(p;X) ≤ V1,k+1(p) − X. Given that we have observed that
it is optimal to set X′ = 0 in any case, any excess payoﬀ to the Firm with k + 1 rounds to go is
best obtained by a commensurate reduction in the net transfer from the Firm to the Agent in the
ﬁrst round (among the k + 1 rounds). This might violate individual rationality for some type of
the Agent, but even if it does not, it still yields a payoﬀ V1,k+1(p;X) no larger than V1,k+1(p)−X
(if it does violate individual rationality, V1,k+1(p;X) must be lower).
45A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Given a function f, the average function of f is denoted
f
a (x) := f (x)/x.
Given a non-negative functionf on [0,1], let sha f denote the largest weakly star-shaped function
that is smaller than f. This function is well-deﬁned, because (i) if f1,f2 are two weakly star-
shaped functions lower than f, the pointwise maximum g (i.e. g(p) := max{f1(p),f2(p)}) is
star-shaped as well,25 and (ii) the limit of a convergent sequence of star-shaped functions is star-
shaped (Thm. 2, Bruckner and Ostrow, 1962), who also show that a star-shaped function must
be non-decreasing.
The theorem claims that the equilibrium payoﬀ, given w, and ˆ w := sha w, is given by
V
p





where ˆ p0 := min{p ∈ [p0,1] : w(p) = sha w(p)}. Further, letting
Iw = cl {p ∈ [0,1] : sha w(p) = w(p) and w
a is strictly increasing at p},
we show that the set of beliefs held by the ﬁrm is contained, and dense, in Iw if Iw  = ∅. If
Iw = ∅, any policy is optimal.
Let us start by showing that this payoﬀ can be achieved asymptotically (i.e., as K → ∞). Let
Jw denote the complement of Iw, which is a union of disjoint open intervals. Let {(p−
n,p+
n)}n∈N
denote an enumeration of its endpoints. Finally, let ˇ p0 := min{p ∈ Iw,p ≥ p0}. Note that, for
25Given p1 < p2 , let g(p1) = fi(p1),g(p2) = fj(p2). Then ga(p2) = fa
j (p2) ≥ fa
i (p2) ≥ fa
i (p1) = ga(p1).




















































Similarly, if ˆ p0 < ˇ p0,
ˆ w(ˇ p0) − ˆ w(ˆ p0) −




Fix any sequence of ﬁnite subsets of points P K =
 
pK
k : k = 0,...,K
 
⊆ Iw ∩ [p0,1] (where
pK
k is strictly increasing in k), for K ∈ N, with pK
0 = ˇ p0, pK
K = 1, such that pK becomes dense
in Iw as K → ∞. Consider the pure strategy according to which, in the ﬁrst period, if ˇ p0 > p0,
the type-1 Agent gives away the information for free that leads to a posterior ˇ p0; afterwards, the
price paid in each period given that the posterior is supposed to move from pK
k to pK
k+1 is given by











. Failure to pay leads to no further disclosure,
and failure to disclose leads to no further payment. Given K, the payoﬀ of following this pure




























Conversely, we show that (i) for any K, the best payoﬀ given w is the same as for some
weakly star-shaped function smaller than w, and (ii) if w ≥ ˜ w, then V1 ≤ ˜ V1. The result follows.






a(p1)) + ··· + pK−1 · (w
a(1) − w
a(pK−1))
= 1 − w(p0) − (1 − pK−1)w
a(1) − ··· − (p1 − p0)w
a(p1),
47so that





Note that maximizing V1,K(p)+w(p) and maximizing V1,K(p) are equivalent, so this amounts to






with p0 = p. Because w ≤ ˜ w implies wa ≤ ˜ wa, we have just established the following.
Lemma 5 Suppose that ˜ w ≥ w pointwise. Then, for every K, and every prior belief p0,
˜ V1,K(p0) ≤ V1,K(p0),
where ˜ V1,K(p0) and V1,K(p0) are the type-1 Agent’s payoﬀs given outside option ˜ w and w, respec-
tively.
To every sequence of beliefs p0,p1,...,pK = 1, we can associate the piecewise linear function wK
on [p0,1] that obtains from linear interpolation given the points
(p0,w(p0)),(p1,w(p1)),...,(1,1).
Lemma 6 For all K, p0, the optimal policy is such that the function wK is weakly star-shaped.





Indeed, if p1,p2,p3 are consecutive jumps, it must be that doing so dominates skipping p2, i.e.
p1 (w
a (p2) − w
a(p1)) + p2 (w
a(p3) − w
a (p2)) ≥ p1 (w
a(p3) − w
a (p1)),
or wa(p3) ≥ wa(p1). A similar argument applies to the ﬁrst jump. ￿
48Note ﬁnally that the payoﬀ from the sequence {p1,...,pK} given w is the same as given wK.
The result follows. The asymptotic properties of the optimal policy follow as well.
We start with the theorem, which implies the lemma by a straighforward computation.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4 and Theorem 3
We start with the theorem, which implies the lemma.
The procedure used by the intermediary can be summarized by a distribution Fk(·|p) over
the Firm’s posterior beliefs, given the prior belief p, and given the number of rounds k. Due to
the fact that this distribution is known, the Firm’s belief must be a martingale, which means









′|p) = 0. (8)
To put it diﬀerently, Fk(·|p) is a mean-preserving spread of the Firm’s prior belief p. 26
Given such a distribution, and some equilibrium to be played in the continuation game for
each resulting posterior belief p′, how much is the Firm willing to pay up front? Again, this must










where, as before, X(p′), or X′ for short, denotes the Firm’s payoﬀ, net of the outside option, in
the continuation game, given that the posterior belief is p′.
Assume that the distribution Fk(·|p) assigns probability q to some posterior belief p′. This
means that the Firm attaches probability q to its next posterior belief turning out to be p′. What
is the probability q1 assigned to this event by the type-1 Agent? This must be qp′/p, because
p





where the ﬁrst equality from the deﬁnition of the event p′, and the second follows from Bayes’
26The notation [0,1] for the domain of integration emphasizes the possibility of an atom at 0. This, however,
plays no role for payoﬀs, as there is no room for transfers once the prior drops to zero, and w(0) = 0, and we will
then revert to the more usual notation.
49rule, given the prior belief p.
Therefore, the maximal payoﬀ that the type-1 Agent expects to receive from the next round









where, as before, V1,k−1(p′,X′) denotes the maximal payoﬀ of the type-1 Agent, with k−1 rounds
to go, given that the Firm’s payoﬀ, net of its outside option, is X′ and its belief is p′.
















and our objective is to maximize this expression, for each p, over all distributions Fk(·|p), as well
as mappings p′  → X′ = X(p′) (subject to (8) and the feasibility of X′).
A.3.1 The Optimal Transfers
As a ﬁrst step in the analysis, we prove the following.
Lemma 7 Fix the prior belief p and the number of remaining rounds k. The best equilibrium
payoﬀ of the type-1 Agent, as deﬁned by (9), is achieved by setting, for each p′ ∈ [0,1], the Firm’s






X∗(p′) if p′ < p,





p′ (1 − V1,k−1 (p′)) − w(p)
1 − p′ .








50Proof: First of all, we must understand the function V1,k(p,X). Note that, as observed earlier,
we can always assume that the equilibrium is eﬃcient: take any equilibrium, and assume that, in
the last round, on the equilibrium path, the type-1 Agent discloses the state. This modiﬁcation
can only relax any incentive (or individual rationality) constraint. This means that payoﬀs must
satisfy (5), which provides a rather elementary upper bound on the maximal payoﬀ to the type-1





Our observation that the equilibrium that maximizes the type-1 Agent’s payoﬀ also maximizes
the sum of the Firm’s and type-1 Agent’s payoﬀs is obviously true here as well. Hence, any
increase in X must lead to a decrease in V1,k(p,X) of at least that amount. As long as X is
such that V0,k (p,X) is positive, we do not need to decrease V1,k(p,X) by more than this amount,
because it is then possible to simply decrease the net transfer made by the Firm to the Agent
in the initial period by as much. Therefore, either V1,k(p,X) = V1,k(p) −X, if X is smaller than
some threshold value X∗




∗ + w(p) = p, or X
∗ =
p(1 − V1,k (p)) − w(p)
1 − p
.
Therefore, for values of X below X∗, we have that V1(p,X) = V1,k(p) − X, and this payoﬀ is
obtained from the equilibrium achieving the payoﬀ V1,k(p) to the type-1 Agent, by reducing the
net transfer from the Firm to the Agent in the initial round by an amount X. For values of X
above X∗, we know that V0,k(p,X) = 0, so that




We may now turn to the issue of the optimal net payoﬀ to grant the Firm in the continuation
round. This can be done pointwise, for each posterior belief p′. The previous analysis suggests
that, to identify what the optimal value of X′ is, it is convenient to break down the analysis into
two cases, according to whether or not X′ is above X∗. Consider some posterior belief p′ in the
51support of the distribution Fk(·|p). From (9), the contribution to the type-1 Agent’s payoﬀ from











= w(p′) + X′ + (V1,k−1(p′) − X′)
p′
p if X′ ≤ X∗(p′),







p if X′ > X∗(p′).
Note that, for X′ > X∗ (p′), the upper bound to this contribution is decreasing in X′, and since
this upper bound is achieved at X′ = X∗(p′), it is best to set X′ = X∗(p′) in this range. For
X′ ≤ X∗(p′), this depends on p′: if p′ > p, it is best to set X′ to zero, while if p′ < p, it is optimal






X∗(p′) if p′ < p,
0 if p′ ≥ p,
as claimed. ￿
This lemma formalizes the intuition from the example that we used in Subsection 3.3: it is
best to promise as high a rent as possible to the Firm if the posterior belief is lower than the prior
belief, and as low as possible if it is higher. The function X∗ describes this upper bound. As in
the example, this bound turns out to be the entire continuation payoﬀ of the type-0 Agent in
the best equilibrium for the type-1 Agent with k−1 periods to go. We can express this bound in
terms of the Firm’s belief and the type-1 Agent’s continuation payoﬀ, given that the equilibrium
is eﬃcient. Of course, it is possible to give even higher rents to the Firm, provided that the
equilibrium that is played in the continuation game gives the type-0 Agent a higher payoﬀ than
the equilibrium that is best for the type-1 Agent. The proof of this lemma establishes that what
is gained in the initial period by considering higher rents is more than oﬀset by what must be
relinquished in the continuation game, in order to generate a high enough payoﬀ to the type-0
Agent.
The key intuition here is that the type-1 Agent assigns a higher probability to the event that
the posterior belief will be p′ > p than does the Firm and conversely, a lower probability to the
event that p′ < p, because she knows that the state is 1. Therefore, the type-1 Agent wants to
52oﬀer the Firm an extra continuation payoﬀ in the event that p′ < p (and collect extra money
for it now), and oﬀer as small a continuation payoﬀ as possible in the event that p′ > p. Given
that the Agent and the Firm have diﬀerent beliefs, there is room for proﬁtable bets, in the form
of transfers whose odds are actuarially fair from the Firm’s point of view, but proﬁtable from
the point of view of the type-1 Agent. Such bets were not possible without the intermediary (at
least in pure strategies), because, at the only posterior belief lower than p, namely p′ = 0, there
was no room for any further transfer in this event (because there was no further information to
be sold).
A.3.2 The Value of an Intermediary
Having solved for the optimal transfers, we may now focus on the issue of identifying the
















p X∗ (p′) +
p′
p V1,k−1(p′) for p′ < p,
w(p′) +
p′
p V1,k−1(p′) for p′ ≥ p,
and the supremum is taken over all distributions Fk(·|p) that satisfy (8), namely, Fk(·|p) must
be a distribution with mean p.
This optimality equation cannot be solved explicitly. Nevertheless, the associated operator is
monotone and bounded above. Therefore, its limiting value as we let k tend to inﬁnity, using the
initial value V1,0(p) = 0 for all p, converges to the smallest (positive) ﬁxed point of this operator.
This ﬁxed point gives us the limiting payoﬀ of the type-1 Agent as the number of rounds grows
without bound.
It turns out that we can guess this ﬁxed point. One of the ﬁxed points of (10) is V1(p) =
p−w(p)
p .
Recall that this value is the upper bound on V1,k(p) that we derived earlier, so it is the highest
payoﬀ that we could have hoped for. We may now ﬁnally prove the theorem.





















































Let us deﬁne xk(p) := p − w(p) − pV1,k(p), and so multiplying through by p, and substituting,
we get




























































Note that the operator mapping xk−1 into xk, as deﬁned by the minimum over Fk(·|p) for each
p, is a monotone operator. Note also that x = 0 is a ﬁxed point of this operator (consider
Fk(·|p) = δp, the Dirac measure at p). We therefore ask whether this operator admits a larger



















It is standard to show that x is continuous on (0,1). Further, consider the feasible distribution







1 − p + ε
x(p − ε) +
1
2
· x(p + ε) + (1 − p)
 











1 − p + ε








(x(p − ε) + (1 − p + ε)w(p − ε)) +
1
2
(x(p + ε) + (1 − p − ε)w(p + ε))
+ ε
 
w(p + ε) − w(p − ε) −
x(p − ε)
1 − p + ε
 
.
Suppose that x(p) > 0 for some p ∈ (0,1). Then, since x is continuous, x > 0 on some interval
I. Because w is continuous, the last summand is then negative for all p ∈ I, for ε > 0 small
enough. This implies that the function z : p  → x(p) + (1 − p)w(p) is convex on I, and therefore
diﬀerentiable a.e. on I. Re-arranging our last inequality, we have
2
 
w(p − ε) − w(p + ε) +
x(p − ε)
1 − p + ε
 
+
z(p) − z(p − ε)
ε
≤
z(p + ε) − z(p)
ε
.





Because x is positive and continuous, it must be equal to zero on I. Because I is arbitrary, it
follows that x = 0 on (0,1).
Because x is the largest ﬁxed point of the optimality equation, and because the map deﬁned
by the optimality equation is monotone, it follows that the limit of the iterations of this map,
55applied to the initial value x0 : x0 (p) := p − w(p) − pV1,0(p), all p ∈ (0,1), is well-deﬁned and
equal to 0. Given the deﬁnition of x, the claim regarding the limiting value of V1,k follows. ￿
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3 and Theorem 2
We adapt the arguments from the proof of Theorem 3. Recall that w is assumed to be weakly
star-shaped (in particular, non-decreasing). Consider a mixed-strategy equilibrium. In terms of
beliefs, such an equilibrium can be summarized by a distribution Fk+1(·|p) that is used by the
Agent (on the equilibrium path) with k + 1 rounds left, given belief p, and the continuation
payoﬀs Wk(·) and Vk(·). As before, we may assume that the equilibrium is eﬃcient, and so we
can assume that, given that the Firm obtains a net payoﬀ of Xk (i.e., given that Wk = w(p)+Xk),
the type-1 Agent receives V1,k(p,Xk), the highest payoﬀ to this type given that the Firm receives
at least a net payoﬀ of Xk. Since V1,k maximizes the sum of the Firm’s and type-1 Agent’s payoﬀ,
it holds that, for all k,p and X ≥ 0,
V1,k(p,X) ≤ V1,k(p) − X.






















i.e. such that the belief of the Firm follows a martingale. To emphasize the importance of the
posterior p′ = 0, we alternatively write this constraint as
  1
0 (p′ − p)dFk+1(p′|p) = pFk+1(0|p),
where
  1
0 dFk+1(p′|p) := 1 − Fk+1(0|p).
If the type-1 Agent randomizes, she must be indiﬀerent between all elements in the support
of its mixed action, that is, for all p′ > 0 in the support of Fk+1(·|p), V1,k(p′,X′) = V k, for some
V k independent of p′. Assume (as will be veriﬁed) that in all relevant arguments, p′ and X ≥ 0




Recall that this is always possible if X is small enough, cf. Lemma 7. Furthermore, for the type-0


























So let V ∗












for which V ∗
1 (1)+w(1) = 1. The function V ∗
1 , and hence h∗ is continuous by standard arguments.
As argued in the text, either h∗ := V ∗
1 +w is equal to ¯ h at p, or it is locally concave at p. Indeed,
for any 0 < p1 < p < p2 ≤ 1,
V
∗










1 (p2) + w(p2)),
and by choosing p1,p2 close to p, the constraint (that X is small enough) is satisﬁed. Clearly,
also, h∗ is no steeper than p  → w(p)/p (given p < p′, consider the distribution F(·|p) that splits p
into {0,p′}, as explained in Subsection 3.2), so that h∗ is no steeper than w. That is, h∗ satisﬁes
all four constraints from Section 4.2.
Recall that hm is deﬁned to be the smallest function satisfying the four requirements. This
function is well-deﬁned, because if h,h′ are two functions satisfying these requirements, the lower
envelope h′′ = min{h,h′} does as well, and if (hn), n ∈ N, is a converging sequence of functions
satisfying them, so does limn→∞ hn.
We now show that hm cannot be improved upon. By monotonicity of the operator T, it
follows that, starting from h0 := w and iterating, the resulting sequence h1 = T(h0 − w) + w,
57h2 = T(h1 − w) + w, etc. must converge to hm.
To show that hm cannot be improved upon, it suﬃces to consider arbitrary two-point distri-
butions splitting p into p1 < p < p2.27 If all three beliefs belong to an interval in which hm < ¯ h,
the result follows from the concavity of hm on such intervals. If p1 = 0, the result follows from
the fact that h∗ is no steeper than p  → w(p)/p. If p1 > 0 is such that hm(p1) = ¯ h(p1), such a
splitting is impossible, as V0(p1) = 0, and so the type-0 Agent would not pay X > 0, and hence
the type-1 Agent could not be indiﬀerent. Hence, we are left with the case in which p1 > 0,
hm(p1) < ¯ h(p1), and hm(˜ p) = ¯ h(˜ p) for some ˜ p ∈ [p1,p2], which can be further reduce! d to the
case hm(p2) = ¯ h(p2). The side bet X must equal V1(p1) − V1(p2), and because V0(p2) = 0, we
have V1(p2) = (p2 − w(p2))/p2. We must have
V0(p1) =
p1 − w(p1) − p1V1(p1)
1 − p1
≥ X = V1(p1) − V1(p2).
This implies that h1(p1) ≤ 1 − (1 − p1)
w(p2)







Note, however, that, since h is no steeper than w(p)/p,














a contradiction, given star-shapedness (if w is weakly star-shaped on the entire interval [p1,p2],
the bet is feasible, but worthless).
27Note that, with arbitrarily many periods, we can always decompose more complicated distributions into a
sequence of two-point distributions. But the linearity of the optimization problem actually implies that two-point
distributions are optimal.
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